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I. INTRODUCTION
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' These first two clauses of the United
States Constitution have meant so many things to so many people over the
years.2 To one ever growing Jewish movement it has meant freedom and
protection from the likes of Cossacks, Nazis, and other hatemongers.' These
are but some of the many groups that have made it their mission to kill Jews
* J.D. Candidate 2006, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center;
M.A. in Jewish Studies, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia; B.A. in Religious Studies, Uni-
versity of Florida, Gainesville. The author would like to thank his wife, family, and friends
for all of their love and support during the writing of this article and to the hard work and
dedication of the Nova Law Review staff during the editing process for their support and
guidance.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. These clauses are often referred to as the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, respectively. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 586, 690 (8th
ed. 2004).
2. See infra Parts Ill-IV.
3. See, e.g., SUE FISHKOFF, THE REBBE'S ARMY: INSIDE THE WORLD OF CHABAD-
LUBAVITCH 24, 72 (2003).
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and to extinguish the light of Judaism. Fleeing from war torn Europe of the
1940s, Chabad-Lubavitch (Chabad), a branch of Orthodox Judaism that prac-
tices Hasidism,4 has made 770 Eastern Parkway, Crown Heights, New York
their world headquarters.5 From this location, Chabad has become one of the
most visible Jewish groups in the world.6
Chabad's mission is in fact to be visible and to spread its form of Juda-
ism to other Jews around the world.7 Chabad has made it a goal to place
shlichim, emissaries, on every comer of the globe.8 It is this wide visibility
that has led to numerous lawsuits in the United States, both initiated by Cha-
bad and by those wishing to stop Chabad's efforts. 9 These lawsuits have
made their way from coast to coast across the United States.' °
This paper will focus on how Chabad has attempted to spread its mes-
sage from community to community and how Jewish and non-Jewish
neighbors have reacted with litigation. While often times the reaction has
been one of welcome and open arms, there are many examples of communi-
ties responding with concerted attempts to force Chabad out." Even when
others did not initiate suit against Chabad, Chabad has been willing to com-
plain when members felt their rights were being violated. 12 Part II of this
4. Chabad is an acronym of the Hebrew words, chochmah, binah, and da'at (wisdom,
understanding, knowledge). Avraham Rubinstein, Habad, in 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA
1013 (1982); FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 18. The term Lubavitch is a geographical reference
to the Russian town where four of the founding rebbes taught. FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 18.
Hasidism is commonly referred to as mystical Judaism. Id. at 17. This form of Judaism was
founded by Rabbi Israel ben Eliezer (born around 1700), or the "Baal Shem Toy" (Besht),
meaning "Master of the Good Name." Id.; Rubinstein, supra, at 1013. The Baal Shem Toy's
disciple Rabbi Dov Ber was the teacher of Rabbi Shneur Zalman, the "Alter Rebbe," who is
the founder of the Chabad-Lubavitch Movement. FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 18.
5. FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 24, 73.
6. Id. at 10.
7. Id. at 12, 31.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Lucas Valley Homeowners Ass'n v. Chabad of N. Bay, Inc., 284 Cal. Rptr.
427, 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that Chabad's receipt of a permit to hold services in a
residential neighborhood was valid even in the face of neighbors' concerns about parking and
noise); Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d 341, 345, 348 (7th Cir.
1990) (recognizing that displaying a Christmas tree in an airport is secular while displaying a
menorah is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction); Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt. v. City
of Burlington, 936 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1991) (denying Chabad's right to place the menorah
in the city park). This is not an exhaustive list, but a few examples in a long trail of litigation.
Cases in Ohio, Georgia, and Florida are discussed below. This paper does not analyze litiga-
tion involving Chabad outside the United States.
10. See Lucas Valley, 284 Cal. Rptr. 427; Lubavitch Chabad House, 917 F.2d 341; Cha-
bad-Lubavitch, 936 F.2d 109.
11. FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 24, 72; see infra Parts III-IV.
12. See infra Parts III-IV.
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paper will introduce the message and the mission of Chabad and how that
has often times, unwittingly, instigated lawsuits. Chabad's message has not
wilted even in the face of these lawsuits. 3 If anything, in more recent law-
suits, Chabad is learning from past mistakes and more carefully choosing the
best legal arguments. Part III of this paper focuses on the Chabad menorah,
which has been heavily litigated across the country. This section discusses a
few examples of cities where Chabad has both succeeded and failed in its
efforts at displaying the menorah. In all of the examples to be discussed, the
goal of publicity for Chabad was achieved. In Part IV of this paper, the fo-
cus is on Florida. Due to the recent growth of the active Chabad community
in Florida and the tough real estate market, there have been a number of
cases concerning the location of Chabad centers in residential neighbor-
hoods. In the examples which will be discussed, the old adage, "location,
location, location,, 14 rings true. Finally, Part V will conclude this paper with
a premonition that Chabad will continue to grow across the country, and so
too will the number of Chabad-related lawsuits.
II. CHABAD COMES TO THE UNITED STATES: A LIGHT UNTO THE JEWS
Chabad became the well-known movement that it is today under the
leadership of the seventh and last rebbe, Menachem Mendel Schneerson. 5
In 1941, Schneerson, affectionately referred to as "the Rebbe," arrived on the
shores of New York.16  The long and dangerous journey out of Nazi-
occupied Europe took him to the United States to join his father-in-law and
other family members. 7 His father-in-law, the sixth Lubavitcher rebbe,
quickly saw Menachem Mendel's potential and appointed him in charge of
outreach. 8 Upon taking the helm of Chabad, Schneerson transformed Cha-
bad from a small and insulated remnant of European Jewry to a major force
in the Jewish community. 9
Part of the Rebbe's vision for Chabad was to have Chabad centers es-
tablished all around the world.20 It is considered an honor for a young Cha-
13. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 10.
14. "Location, location, location" is the colloquial phrase referring to the importance of
real estate when building or opening a new home or business.
15. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 10.
16. See id. at 73.
17. See id.
18. See id at 72-73.
19. See id. at 10-12.
20. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 12. Even after the Rebbe's death, Chabad has contin-
ued to grow:
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bad member, a Chabadnick, to be sent out as an emissary to open up a Cha-
bad Center, whether it is in Boca Raton or Timbuktu.2' Most often a young
couple is sent with just enough money for housing and to get started.22 It
would be up to them to meet people and create a center in the community.2
This usually requires a lot of hard work and fundraising.24 The first goal
though is always to get people interested and involved and to spread Chabad
teachings.25 The size of the center will depend on the needs of the commu-
21nity.
Usually Chabadnicks will set up shop wherever they believe they can
best meet the needs of the community and of course this decision also de-
pends on the funding they have received, if any, prior to their arrival there.27
If a storefront shop is in the best location and affordable, then the emissary
might set up there; however, if the emissary can only afford a home to live in
at that time and not such a meeting place, then often times the emissary's
home will become the meeting place.28 The focus though is always on pro-
viding for the community's needs, over and above any emissary's needs.29
Wherever Chabad emissaries do choose to live or set up a center, Cha-
bad has always been involved in the local community.30 Sometimes this
means speaking at the local schools about Jewish holidays, and other times it
means inviting people over for Shabbat dinner.3' One common trend among
Between 1994 and 2002, more than 610 new emissary couples took up their postings and
more than 705 new Chabad institutions were opened, including 450 new facilities pur-
chased or built from scratch, bringing the total number of institutions world-wide-
synagogues, schools, camps, and community centers--to 2,766. In the year 2000, 51
new Chabad facilities were established in California alone.
Id.
21. See id. at 31. One rabbi exclaimed that one can "'find more [people] every day will-
ing to go on shlichus [missions] to farther places .... One guy just called me. He wants to go
to Cyprus. Imagine... the rest of his life in Cyprus."' Id.
22. See id. at 15.
23. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 15. "These young, newly married Chabad couples
leave home with one-way tickets and-if they're lucky-a year's salary. After that, most are
expected to make their own way financially .... [Tlhe individual shliach [emissary] couple is
pretty much on its own .. " Id.
24. Id. at 160.
25. Id. at 11,121.
26. See id. at 160.
27. FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 160. Each Chabad center is responsible for itself. See id.
"Shlichim in the field are responsible for their own fundraising, and they must find the money
they need not only for their own operation, but also to raise their children, pay their mortgage,
and put food on their table." Id.
28. See id. at 161.
29. See id.
30. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 11.
31. Id. at 11, 30.
[Vol. 30:2:303
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Chabad emissaries is to host large parties celebrating the Jewish holidays.32
This has become a way for Chabad members to show non-observant Jews
how Judaism can offer both spirituality and fun.33
The Jewish holiday that has often received the most public attention,
due to the way Chabad chooses to spread the holiday's message, is Chanu-
kah. 4 It is Chabad's display of one of the symbols of the holiday, the Cha-
nukah menorah, 35 a nine-branched candelabrum, that has led to some of the
most protracted litigation.36
III. IF You BUILD IT A LAWSUIT WILL FOLLOW: To LIGHT THE MENORAH
OR NOT TO LIGHT THE MENORAH
One of the best known symbols of Chabad in most communities, other
than the men being known for wearing black hats and black coats and having
beards, is their large Chanukah menorahs.37 Chabad emissaries usually try to
find the most visible place in the city possible to place the menorah.38 While
some might argue that this symbol of Chanukah is meant to compete with the
Christmas tree or Christmas decorations, Jewish law requires that every Jew
place a Chanukah menorah in a place that can be seen by strangers. 39 This
32. See id. at 11.
33. See id. at 11, 30.
34. See id. at 11. The Jewish holiday of Chanukah is an eight-day festival, commemorat-
ing two great miracles in Jewish history: 1) a small group of Jews, known as the Maccabees,
defeated the much larger Syrian-Greek army; and 2) the rededication of the Holy Temple in
Jerusalem (circa 164 B.C.E.). See Moshe David Hem, Hanukkah, in 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
JUDAICA 1280 (1982); RABBI JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, JEWISH LITERACY: THE MOST IMPORTANT
THINGS TO KNOW ABOUT THE JEWISH RELIGION, ITS PEOPLE, AND ITS HISTORY 117-18 (1991).
Chanukah is known as the Holiday of Lights because upon the Maccabees entering the Tem-
ple, they discovered a small jar of holy oil that was only enough to last for one day, but in-
stead it lasted for eight days. Hem, supra, at 1283-84. This is also often referred to as a
Chanukah miracle. Id. at 1284.
35. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 11. The menorah is a symbol of the holiday and has
eight evenly laid branches with a ninth branch set off from the others known as a shammash
(servant) that is meant to light all of the others. Jacob Elbaum, Hanukkkah Lamp, in 7 EN-
CYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1288-92, 1315 (1982).
36. See generally, e.g., Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt. v. City of Burlington, 936 F.2d 109 (2d
Cir. 1991) (regarding denial of request to place menorah in city park); Lubavitch Chabad
House, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1990) (regarding the City of Chicago's
denial of Lubavitch's request to display a free-standing Chanukah menorah at O'Hare Interna-
tional Airport).
37. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 11.
38. See id.
39. See Elbaum, supra note 35, at 1289-90.
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symbol of Chanukah is over a thousand years old.4' During the Chanukah
holiday, the menorah is often placed in a central location, so that many
members of the local community can see it.4 The more visible the location,
the more attention it gets. This increased visibility has brought both admirers
and detractors out of the woodwork.
A. Cincinnati, Ohio Exemplifies the Difficulty Faced by Chabad in Many
Cities
One example of a city that has attempted (and is continuing to attempt)
to prevent Chabad from placing its menorah in the city's downtown square is
the City of Cincinnati. 42 In Chabad of Southern Ohio v. City of Cincinnati,43
a battle ensued between a local Chabad group and the City of Cincinnati (the
City).' This case was not the first time the City has faced off with groups
wanting to use the downtown square, known as Fountain Square Plaza; in
fact, this case is one out of a series of cases where the City has attempted to
limit public displays to only those of the City counsel's choosing.45
It was not difficult to anticipate that litigation would follow when Rabbi
Sholom Kalmanson was told that the only time that he could not put up a
menorah in the city square was during the winter months, which is of course
during the season of Chanukah.' The City created an ordinance that re-
stricted the use of Fountain Square for the City's exclusive use from the last
two weeks of November, through the month of December, and the first week
40. See id. at 1288-90. Most often, Jews who display a menorah place it on their window
sill to be seen by passersby. Id. at 1289-90.
41. See id.
42. Chabad of S. Ohio v. City of Cincinnati (Chabad Ohio 1), 233 F. Supp. 2d 975, 976
(S.D. Ohio 2002), vacated, 537 U.S. 1501, 1502 (2002).
43. Id. at 975.
44. See id. at 979-80. While the court documents do not make any claims of an-
tisemitism or anti-Judaism as a motive for the actions of the City, Rabbi Kalmanson believes
that it is "obvious what was behind it all." Telephone Interview with Sholom B. Kalmanson,
Rabbi, Chabad of Southern Ohio (July 24, 2005).
45. Chabad Ohio I, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 977, 981, 984. The city has a history of litigation.
See, e.g., Knight Riders of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Cincinnati, 72 F.3d 43 (6th Cir. 1995).
While not frequently linked, both the Ku Klux Klan and Chabad have found themselves suing
the city over the years to lift restrictions on their ability to gather ceremoniously in Fountain
Square Plaza. See id. at 45; Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati (Congregation
Lubavitch 1), 923 F.2d 458, 459 (6th Cir. 1991).
46. Chabad Ohio I, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 978-79.
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of January.47 This is the very square that Rabbi Kalmanson had already
submitted a permit request to display his approximately ten-foot tall menorah
from November 29, 2002 to December 8, 2002.48 In fact, Chabad had been
celebrating Chanukah in the very same square since 1985 by erecting a me-
norah49 and holding a candle lighting ceremony on one of the days of the
holiday.5°
The Cincinnati City Counsel unanimously passed the restrictive ordi-
nance without community discussion. 5  The ordinance's text specifies,
among other purposes, that its goal is "to promote and develop tourism and
recreation" and "to encourage, promote, stimulate, and assist in the develop-
ment of the Cincinnati business economy.52 Not surprisingly, Chabad filed
a complaint, along with a homeless advocacy group that annually sponsors a
program called "Santa on the Square" during the winter season, requesting
an injunction from the court.53 In Chabad of Southern Ohio, the simple yet
persuasive argument by Chabad was that their First Amendment rights were
violated.54 The district court agreed.55
During an evidentiary hearing before the court, the City was incapable
of presenting evidence that explained the origins or the reason for the ordi-
nance's seven-week ban on issuing permits during the time of the year when
the Fountain Square was most widely requested. 6 However, there was evi-
dence presented that the City was at that time preparing for a display created
by the City, which was to include two Christmas trees and a skating rink.
7
Coincidentally, a tree lighting ceremony was also planned by the City to take
place on November 29, the first night of Chanukah that year.58
47. Id. at 978 (citation omitted). Since the Hebrew calendar and the Jewish holidays are
set according to a lunar cycle, the days of Chanukah on the secular calendar fluctuate from
any time in November to the first week of January. See id. at 977 n. 1. The first day of Cha-
nukah on the Hebrew calendar is always Kislev 25. Hem, supra note 34, at 1280.
48. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
49. Id. at 977
50. See id. at 979.
51. Id. at 978.
52. Id. at 979.
53. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
54. Id. at 981. Chabad also argued that the City violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by retroactively applying the city's new regulations. Id.
55. Id. at 988.
56. Id. at 980.
57. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 980.
58. Id.
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Chabad made a strong case, and the court ruled that Chabad had met its
burden for a preliminary injunction.59 It is ironic that one of the arguments
by the City was that the display of a menorah is not symbolic speech and
thus not protected by the First Amendment 6°-as this fact was conceded by
the City in the same court in a similar case ten years earlier.6'
Chabad's primary First Amendment arguments were based on the pro-
tected nature of speech62 and their ability to use the public forum for this type
of speech.6 3 In both arguments, the court cited previous Chabad litigation
against the City where "the very same menorah at issue here [was upheld] as
speech deserving full First Amendment protection." 64 This decision was
easy for the court based on clear precedent.65 Even though the menorah is
considered speech (of a symbolic nature) deserving protection, the court also
needed to decide if "'the [g]overnment's interest in limiting the use of its
property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to
use the property for other purposes."
66
In determining the government's interest, the court defined the forum at
issue and determined the type of forum. 6 7 This classification is an important
step in the constitutional analysis since different types of forums are afforded
varying levels of protection. 68 Again, this determination was easy since there
was no argument that Fountain Square was the relevant forum, and, further-
more, it had already been defined by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals as a
traditional public forum. 69 The final step taken by the court was to determine
if the City's regulation was a constitutional restriction on the use of Fountain
Square.7"
59. Id. at 981. Chabad proved that there was a "strong likelihood of succeeding on the
merits of their free speech claims under the First Amendment." Id.
60. Id. (citing Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati (Congregation Lubavitch
111), 997 F.2d 1160, 1164 (6th Cir. 1993)).
61. See Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati (Congregation Lubavitch II), 807
F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
62. Chabad Ohio I, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
63. See id. at 982-86.
64. Id. at 981 (citing Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati (Congregation
Lubavitch 1), 923 F.2d 458, 461-62 (6th Cir. 1991)).
65. See id. at 981-86.
66. Id. at 982 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 800 (1985)).
67. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 982.
68. Id. at 982 n.3.
69. Id. at 982 (citing Knight Riders of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Cincinnati, 72 F.3d
43, 45 (6th Cir. 1995)).
70. Id. at 983.
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The restrictions were considered content-neutral on their face since all
types of private speech were forbidden during the holiday season, regardless
of their content.7' This is not the end of the analysis because even a content-
neutral restriction on its face can be content-based in fact.72 This situation
was similar to a previous Chabad case where the City passed an ordinance
restricting unattended structures in Fountain Square.73 In that case, the ordi-
nance was found facially content-neutral; but the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found it de facto content-based 74 since the aim, as evidenced by state-
ments of various city council members, was to prohibit a Ku Klux Klan cross
and a menorah from being erected.75 In this instance, the court heard testi-
mony by Rabbi Kalmanson that a city official suggested that the rabbi
quickly get his permit request in, since the permits were being issued on a
first come first serve basis to prevent the Ku Klux Klan from receiving a
permit.76 It was also telling that the City's own stated intention was to ensure
that any speech that was heard in Fountain Square appealed to "'the widest
of audiences,"' thus forbidding that speech which appealed to a minority of
individuals.77
After concluding that the regulations were content-based, the court then
looked to whether the City's permit scheme was "narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest. 7  The City listed six interests, which it
believed justified the ban on non-governmental use of Fountain Square dur-
ing the winter season.79 All six were found not to justify the regulation and
71. Id. at 984.
72. See Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati (Congregation Lubavitch II1), 997
F.2d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir. 1993).
73. Id. at 1162.
74. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 984.
75. Congregation Lubavitch Il1, 997 F.2d at 1164-65.
76. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 984.
77. Id. "Distinctions between speech that is 'controversial' and speech that is 'accept-
able,' or between that which appeals to 'the widest of audiences' and that which appeals to
only a few individuals, are distinctions based, at the very least, on content." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 984-85. The newly amended city code listed the following purposes for its
enactment:
(1) to better coordinate competing uses of Fountain Square;
(2) to ensure equal access to Fountain Square;
(3) to promote and develop tourism and recreation;
(4) to encourage, promote, stimulate, and assist in the development of the Cincinnati
business economy;
(5) to maintain, develop, and increase employment opportunities for those who live,
work, and may consider moving to Cincinnati and the Cincinnati region; and
(6) to pursue efforts to promote the expansion of the population residing within Cincin-
nati and to specifically encourage, stimulate, and develop an expanding downtown resi-
dent population.
2006]
9
Reinstein: The Growth of Chabad in the United States and the Rise of Chabad
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LAW REVIEW
its ban on issuing permits.8 ° None of them clearly rose to the level of a com-
pelling state interest that could override Chabad's First Amendment rights. 81
The City was also unable to show how the ban on the issuance of permits
over the seven weeks during the winter holiday season fulfilled any of the
City's stated interests.82 On the contrary, the court commented that it would
seem as though the menorah, "Santa on the Square" program, or any other
private speech, would attract more tourists and visitors to Fountain Square
than just the "arguably Christian symbols featured in the City-sanctioned
holiday display. '83 Even if the regulations were content-neutral, under a
lesser constitutional standard (that of time, place, and manner restrictions),
the ordinances were still not "narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernment interest," nor would they leave open the required alternative chan-
nels of communication.84
The district court issued the preliminary injunction barring enforcement
of the ordinances and concluded that, based on Chabad's arguments, the suit
had a strong likelihood of success on the merits.85 However, this was not the
end. In a whirlwind of appeals over a forty-eight hour timeframe, the city
obtained a stay of the injunction from the Sixth Circuit followed by Chabad
taking the issue to the United States Supreme Court, where Justice Stevens,
acting as a Circuit Justice, vacated the stay. 6 Chabad prevailed over the
"outrageous intrusion on the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment" and
was able to celebrate Chanukah in Fountain Square.87 This dispute began
just prior to Chanukah in November 2001, but it took the Sixth Circuit until
April 2004 to affirm the District Court's decision.8
Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
80. Id.
81. Id. The court cited the prevention of terrorism and the practice of professions as the
types of regulations that rise to the level of compelling state interests to justify restrictions on
freedom of speech. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
84. Id. at 986. The court explained that no other place in Cincinnati is comparable to
Fountain Square as a location providing the opportunity for speeches and demonstrations. See
id. Even presidential candidates chose to hold rallies in Fountain Square when in the area. Id.
85. Id. at 986-87. The injunction was ordered on November 27, 2002, just two days
before the first night of Chanukah for that year. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 975, 980,
988.
86. Chabad of S. Ohio v. City of Cincinnati (Chabad Ohio I1), 537 U.S. 1501, 1501-02
(2002).
87. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
88. See Chabad of S. Ohio v. City of Cincinnati (Chabad Ohio 111), 363 F.3d 427, 436
(6th Cir. 2004). In reality, the case history between Chabad and the city goes back to the
[Vol. 30:2:303
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Even though, during Chanukah of 2004, Chabad of Southern Ohio re-
ceived the proper permit and placed the menorah in Fountain Square, future
Chanukah celebrations are still in doubt.89 According to Rabbi Kalmanson,
more litigation might be on the horizon.90 The City has notified Chabad that
it is planning to do construction in Fountain Square and is also considering
selling it to private entities.9' In light of the past two decades of fortitude
exhibited by Chabad in Ohio, it appears that the City once again will have a
fight on its hands.
B. Atlanta, Georgia Greets Chabad with Good Old Southern Hospitality
In the case of Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Harris,92 followed by
Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller,93 two Chabad rabbis sought to place
a menorah on the steps of the capitol building and in the Capitol Rotunda. 94
Similar to the cases in Ohio, Chabad of Georgia did not succeed at first, but,
in the end, the First Amendment prevailed, and the menorah took its place in
Atlanta.95
In 1989, the Georgia Building Authority granted Chabad permission to
display their fifteen-foot menorah in Atlanta on the plaza in front of the state
capitol building for the eight days of Chanukah. 96 Permission was also
granted for an accompanying sign, "'HAPPY CHANUKAH from CHABAD
OF GEORGIA,'" and for a lighting ceremony.97 Each day the menorah was
to be lit for no more then forty-five minutes.98 Located inside the Capitol
Rotunda was a live nativity scene, "surrounded by a Christmas tree, reindeer,
gifts and a Santa Claus."99 This display was sponsored and organized by the
1980s. See Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati (Congregation Lubavitch 1), 923
F.2d 458, 459 (6th Cir. 1991).
89. Telephone Interview with Sholom B. Kalmanson, supra note 44.
90. Id.
91. Id. Rabbi Kalmanson has not shied away from litigating with the City as a matter of
principle. Id. The rabbi also sees the attention that the menorah has received as positive since
it helps to publicize the miracle of Chanukah, which is his goal to begin with. Id.
92. Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Harris (Chabad Ga. 1), 752 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga.
1990), rev'd en banc, 5 F.3d 1383 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
93. Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller (Chabad Ga. V), 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993).
94. See Chabad Ga. 1, 752 F. Supp. at 1064; Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1386. The style of
both cases reflects the change in sitting governors, Joe Frank Harris in 1990 and Zell Miller in
1992.
95. Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1395-96.
96. Chabad Ga. I, 752 F. Supp. at 1064.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1065.
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Georgia Building Authority.'0° There were no public complaints or distur-
bances formally noted that year attributed to the menorah's placement or the
nativity scene and its accoutrements.'10
The following year, in 1990, Chabad attempted to get the same permis-
sion from the Building Authority, but was met with new limitations.'02 Ac-
cording to the Attorney General, Chabad could still display the menorah and
conduct a candle lighting ceremony, but, instead of eight days, they could
only observe one day. 10 3 Ironically, this scenario sounds like the Chanukah
miracle in reverse. The Attorney General concluded that the entire eight
days would give off the impression of an unconstitutional state endorsement
of re-ligion.' ° The Christmas scene, as displayed the previous year, was
given a similar pronouncement due to the dominance of religious symbols,
but a tree and ceremony led by a Methodist minister was permitted. 0 5
Soon after the restrictions were placed on Chabad's ability to exhibit the
menorah, Chabad, led by two rabbis, initiated a complaint and requested a
temporary restraining order based on First Amendment violations.10 6 Chabad
had to meet four elements to obtain the order: 1) irreparable harm would be
inflicted; 2) there was no harm to the state; 3) public interest was not ad-
versely affected; and 4) the claim was likely to succeed on the merits of the
case if a trial was to proceed.'0 7 The district court found that Chabad had met
the first three requirements, but it was the final one that Chabad did not over-
come. 1
08
The first step in the court's analysis was to determine if Chabad did in
fact have a constitutionally valid claim."° Chabad was able to show that the
menorah did fall under the category of constitutionally protected symbolic
speech."0 The issue then became whether this type of speech was permitted
on the steps of the capitol building."' Since the state had previously deter-
mined that the plaza was a public forum and that it has been regularly used
100. Id.
101. Chabad Ga. 1, 752 F. Supp. at 1064-65.
102. Id. at 1065.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See id. In addition to the invocation by the minister, secular and religious songs were
performed, and the governor's wife gave a benediction. Chabad Ga. 1, 752 F. Supp. at 1065.
106. See id. at 1064-65.
107. Id. at 1066.
108. Id. at 1066, 1068.
109. See id. at 1066.
110. Chabad Ga. 1, 752 F. Supp. at 1066.
111. See id.
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over the years for public debates and rallies, the court then needed to decide
if the restrictions placed on Chabad were content based.'
1
"
2
A content based restriction on speech in the public forum required a
strict scrutiny analysis, whereby the state must show the restrictions were
"narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.""' 3 In its analysis, the
court distinguished this case from two other Chabad menorah cases that were
published the year before: one in the Supreme Court and one in the Second
Circuit." 14 The court did not believe that people visiting the capitol building
would confuse "a menorah labelled as the property of Chabad for a state
sponsored event. ' 5
The State also argued that under a non-content-based policy, the restric-
tions placed on Chabad were reasonable in the time, place and manner that
the menorah could be displayed." 6 This was a persuasive argument for the
court since the State could show that the Georgia Building Authority had
instituted an unrelated policy in 1988 "that placement of any object on the
property of the grounds by members of the public is prohibited."' ' 7 While
Chabad claimed that the 1988 policy did not play a part in the decision to
deny Chabad permission in 1990, the court held that since the policy is valid
it made no difference if it was originally considered by the Building Author-
ity.'' 8
Interestingly enough, the court concluded its order in denying Chabad
the right to place the menorah in the square by contrasting the Christmas tree
and the menorah." 9 The court found that the Christmas tree in the Rotunda
"is a mixed secular-and-religious symbol which is not predominantly reli-
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1066-67 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981)).
114. Id. at 1067 (distinguishing this case from County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573 (1989) and from the majority opinion in Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d
Cir. 1989)). The Georgia court decided that its case was different from the case in Pennsyl-
vania because the menorah at issue there was to be maintained by county employees. Chabad
Ga. I, 752 F. Supp. at 1067. The Vermont decision was not binding in its finding that by the
mere proximity of the menorah to the seat of government the state was endorsing religion. Id.
The court agreed with the dissent in Kaplan where the judge concluded: "[p]ermitting reli-
gious speech in a public forum in and of itself 'does not confer any imprimatur of state ap-
proval on religious sects or practices' any more than permitting political speech conveys gov-
ernmental endorsement of a political group." Id. (quoting Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1033) (Meskill,
J., dissenting)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Chabad Ga. 1, 752 F. Supp. at 1067.
118. Id. at 1068.
119. Id.
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gious," whereas the menorah is a predominantly religious symbol.120 The
court held that the ban on Chabad's eight-day celebration was narrowly tai-
lored, and thus Chabad's motion for a temporary restraining order was de-
nied.
12 1
This final comment by the district court foreshadowed how they were to
rule the following year. 22 Since Chabad could no longer keep the menorah
on the square throughout the celebration of Chanukah, they next sought to
move the menorah into the Rotunda, surrounded by secular displays and
right where the Christmas tree was permitted to be displayed. 23
Chabad made the request of the governor to allow the menorah to be
placed in the Rotunda like the Christmas tree, but four months went by with-
out an answer. 24 Chabad returned to the courts again to seek relief.' 25 At
first, the request by Chabad to place the menorah in the Capitol Rotunda, in
the form of an amended complaint before the appellate court, was denied per
curiam by a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit. 126 Eventually, the
Eleventh Circuit convened en banc to reverse and granted Chabad's menorah
a place in the Rotunda. 127 The court, in an opinion by the chief judge, con-
cluded that although the state had a compelling interest in distancing itself
from the endorsement of any religion, the allowance of Chabad to display the
menorah in the Rotunda would not necessarily signify that the state is en-
dorsing, and thus establishing, Judaism. 28
Over the years various groups have utilized the open space in the center
of the Capitol Building. 29 The court highlighted various organizations and
programs that have utilized the Rotunda such as the National Organization
for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, two Holocaust commemoration ceremo-
nies, and the previous year's Methodist minister. 30 There have also been
120. Id.
121. Id. The decision by the court was entered on December 11, 1990, the first evening of
Chanukah that year. Chabad Ga. 1, 752 F. Supp. at 1063.
122. See id. at 1068.
123. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller (Chabad Ga. V), 5 F.3d 1383, 1386 (11th
Cir. 1993).
124. Id. at 1386-87.
125. Id. at 1387.
126. Id.; Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller (Chabad Ga. I1), 976 F.2d 1386, 1387 (1 1th
Cir. 1992) (upholding the district court decision).
127. Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1385, 1387; Chabad Ga. II, 976 F.2d 1386, reh'g granted,
(Chabad Ga. 11), 988 F.2d 1563, 1564 (11 th Cir. 1993).
128. Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1385.
129. Id. at 1386.
130. Id.
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unattended displays there, such as an eighteen-foot tall Indian hut that was
exhibited during Indian Heritage Week.'
31
The court focused its discussion on the inability of the state to demon-
strate how the exclusion of Chabad's display from the Rotunda based solely
on the content of the exhibit could withstand the heightened constitutional
analysis of strict scrutiny. 32 More specifically, the court could not "counte-
nance Georgia's exclusion of Chabad's display from the Rotunda unless
Georgia [could] demonstrate that the exclusion [was] 'necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it [was] narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.'' 133 Georgia was unable to do so."
Georgia could not support its claim that it must not permit Chabad to
display the menorah in order to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.
35
The court went one step further to state that if Georgia did have a compelling
state interest in keeping the menorah out of "the Rotunda, total exclusion is
not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."'
' 36
In order to determine that Georgia would not violate the Establishment
Clause, the court utilized the test created in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 37 The test
must be used to determine if Georgia did permit Chabad open-access to the
Rotunda, as it does all of its citizens, 38 would Georgia be violating the Es-
tablishment Clause?139 The Lemon test requires that the state act: 1) with a
secular purpose; 2) with the primary effect neither advancing nor inhibiting
religion; and 3) without fostering excessive entanglement with religion. 4'
Georgia did not argue in depth either the first or the third prong of the
test, but focused its attention on the second prong.'4 ' The court used the
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1387.
133. Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1387 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198
(1992)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1388.
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
138. Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1389. The court set out to review under the Lemon test
whether the denial of Chabad's request to display the menorah in the rotunda was consistent
with its neutral open-access policy. Id. The court stated:
As a matter of course, Georgia grants private speakers equal and unimpeded access to the
Rotunda, a designated public forum. Its citizens may come and go, speak and listen, ap-
plaud and condemn, and preach and blaspheme as they please .... In sum, Georgia neu-
trally opens the Rotunda as a public forum available to all speakers, and Chabad seeks to
exercise its constitutional right to speak in that public forum.
Id. at 1388-89.
139. Id. at 1389.
140. Id. (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).
141. ChabadGa./V5 F.3d at 1389.
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County of Allegheny v. ACLU decision, in conjunction with Lemon, to de-
termine if the placement of the menorah in the Rotunda would create the
appearance of state endorsement of religious beliefs, as argued by Georgia. 42
The court stated that Georgia was just plain wrong. 4 3 It is Georgia's
stated policy to allow open and equal access to the Rotunda, as a public fo-
rum.'" Any reasonable person would not visit the capitol building, enter the
Rotunda, and, upon seeing either a menorah or a Christmas tree, believe that
Georgia officially endorsed Judaism or Christianity. 14 5 "Precisely because
the religious speech is communicated in a true public forum, however, the
state, by definition, neither endorses nor disapproves of the speech ... but
rather acts in a strictly neutral manner toward, private speech."'' 46
In dicta, the court advised the state not to create a public forum in a
place that citizens would automatically associate with state authority if it
believed the citizens of Georgia would not be able to distinguish the private
speech of some with the state sponsored speech of others.47 If the state was
so concerned with this perception, it should have taken steps to teach the
uninformed and not to silence constitutionally protected speech, such as the
display of Chabad's menorah.148 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that Geor-
gia could allow Chabad a place in the Rotunda to display its fifteen-foot me-
norah during Chanukah and this display would not violate the Establishment
Clause. 141
142. Id. at 1390 (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989)). Alle-
gheny added an endorsement test that may be considered in Establishment cases, but in that
case the courthouse steps were not considered a public forum so it is distinguished from the
facts of Chabad Ga. IV. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597; Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1390-91.
143. See Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1395-96.
144. Id. at 1392.
145. Id. at 1390 n.11.
146. Id. at 1393.
147. Id. at 1393-94.
148. Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1394. The court, seemingly amused, quoted Chabad's
counsel who recited a limerick at oral argument in order to emphasize his point: "It seems to
a young rabbi of Chabad, [t]hat the Constitution is exceedingly odd; [t]o protect all speech in a
public place [o]n AIDS, abortion, or race, [b]ut to prohibit any person's mention of God." Id.
at 1394 n.17.
149. Id. at 1395-96.
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IV. LOTS OF LITIGATION IN THE SUNSHINE STATE
A. Home Is Where the Prayer Is at: Disney World, Universal Studios,
and Chabad
Two additional examples of Chabad-initiated litigation occurred just
south of Georgia, in Florida. 5' In both cases, a local Chabad rabbi lawfully
owned a home in a residential neighborhood; and, in both cases, the rabbi's
neighbors were not pleased with the apparent transformation of the rabbi's
home into a place of meeting and worship.'5' In each of the cases discussed
below, it was not only an individual neighbor that challenged Chabad's right
to hold services or meetings out of their homes, but it was also the city
through a zoning enforcement board or local city commission.'
While in each case various First Amendment arguments were made, as
well as other constitutional arguments, in both cases there also appeared po-
tential claims of antisemitism against the city.'53 In neither case though did
Chabad outwardly claim such motives were involved in denying them the
right to worship in the community of their choosing. 5 4 Antisemitic motives
are not easy to prove, but in both cases there were non-Jewish, particularly
Christian, groups that were allowed to do what the city was arguing Chabad
was not permitted to do.
55
In Sue Fishkoff's book, The Rebbe's Army, she dedicates a whole chap-
ter to the South Florida Jewish community and the growth of Chabad in Flor-
ida.'56 South Florida is described as the second largest Jewish community in
the United States, only after New York City. 57 Not only does Chabad in
150. Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov II), 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1331 (M.D. Fla.
2004), afJd in part, rev'd in part, 410 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005); Amended Complaint
at 1, Hollywood Cmty. Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, No. 04-61212 (S.D. Fla. Nov.
24, 2004) [hereinafter HCS Complaint].
151. Konikov II, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-32; Omnibus Order Denying in Part and Grant-
ing in Part Defendant Sal Oliveri's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (D.E. 17-1); De-
nying Motion to Strike in Part Amended Complaint (D.E. 17-2); Denying as Moot Defendant
Sal Oliveri's Motion for Protective Order (D.E. 29); Denying Defendant Sal Oliveri's Motion
to Strike Plaintiffs Response (D.E. 47) at 2, Hollywood Cmty. Synagogue, Inc. v. City of
Hollywood, No. 04-61212 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2005) [hereinafter HCS Order].
152. Konikov 1I, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1332; HCS Order, supra note 151, at 3.
153. See Konikov 11, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1334-35; HCS Order, supra note 151, at 5.
154. See Konikov 11, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1331; HCS Order, supra note 151, at 1-7.
155. Konikov 11, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1335; HCS Order, supra note 151, at 5-6.
156. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 33. In this chapter, Fishkoff's research focuses on
Boca Raton, in Palm Beach County, which has not in fact had any known litigation filed
against Chabad there. Id.
157. Id.
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South Florida make itself seen and heard because of the hard work of each
individual Chabad rabbi, but now attention is also on Chabad because of its
numbers and the sheer masses that are visible in the community. 58 This
growth has led to at least two recent legal actions in the Sunshine State. 5 9
One of the examples of Chabad related litigation can be found in one of
the most tourist friendly cities in the world, Orlando, Florida.160 The court
reminded the parties in Konikov v. Orange County 6' that Orange County is
home to Disney World, Sea World, and Universal Studios, among other
theme parks, but it seems to not have room for Chabad. 62 This suit began in
2001 in a county administrative hearing, and eventually made its way up to
the United States Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 63 On June 3, 2005, the
court decided that the district court left some unanswered questions and sent
the case back for a determination of the definition of "religious organization"
under the Orange County Zoning Code."6 The Eleventh Circuit also held
that Chabad did have an action under the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000 as to unequal treatment and with
regard to Due Process. 65 Finally in January 2006, the district court, on re-
mand, concluded that Rabbi Konikov and Chabad of Orlando did have a
right to utilize the residential home as a place of worship.
166
In 2001, Rabbi Konikov began to use a single-family home situated in a
residential neighborhood as a meeting place. 167 While many new neighbors
might bring over apple pie or freshly baked cookies, the rabbi's neighbors
complained of excessive noise and traffic. 168 Even though there are many
examples in the same county of religious groups meeting in a member's
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Konikov II, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328; HCS Order, supra note 151.
160. Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov II1), 410 F.3d 1317, 1319-20 (11 th Cir. 2005).
161. Id. at 1317.
162. Id. at 1319-20.
163. Id. at 1320.
164. Id. at 1330. As of the time of the writing of this paper, the district court has not yet
settled the matter.
165. Konikov lll, 410 F.3d at 1322-25, 1331; see Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
166. Order on Remand at 1, 9-10, Konikov v. Orange County, No. 02-CV-376 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Konikov Order].
167. Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov I1), 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1331-32 (M.D. Fla.
2004).
168. Id. at 1332. One neighbor eagerly testified that a "high traffic business is being run
out of a single-family dwelling." Id. at 1334 (internal quotations omitted). Another explained
his dissatisfaction with Chabad as a neighbor: "I did not buy my house next to a chabad or a
synagogue or anything else. I bought my house in a residential neighborhood four years ago.
And now it's become changed." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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home, in a residential neighborhood, 169 the complaints against Konikov
brought on a full-scale investigation by the Orange County Code Enforce-
ment Division. 7°
This investigation led the Code Enforcement Board to conclude that
Rabbi Konikov "was operating a religious organization from a residential
property without special exception approval and thus was in violation" of a
number of county codes.'7 1 It was at that time that Konikov initiated litiga-
tion against the county and against a number of members of the Code En-
forcement Board personally.7 2
The first two issues before the court were 1.) whether Rabbi Konikov
could have two rabbis testify on his behalf as experts in Hebrew and Yiddish
terms and to testify as to the religious practices and obligations of Hassidim,
and 2.) whether an attorney could testify as an expert on the constitutionality
of the zoning codes as applied in the case. 173 The court held that the attorney
could not testify, but that the rabbi's testimony would offer insight into de-
termining the extent that the county regulations restrict Rabbi Konikov's
ability to observe Judaism. 1 4 This testimony will later be important because
169. Id. at 1335. The pastors at Northland Community Church and Trinity Baptist Church
testified on behalf of Rabbi Konikov that their worshippers meet weekly at individual homes
for prayer and none of their groups have been fined or ticketed by the code enforcement divi-
sion for such activities. Konikov I1, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
170. Id. at 1332.
171. Id. at 1336. No explanation was offered by Rabbi Konikov to the court as to why he
never sought a code provided exception to the zoning regulation. See id.
172. Id.
173. Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov 1), 290 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1316, 1318-19 (M.D.
Fla. 2003).
174. Id. at 1319-20. The Magistrate's decision was confirmed and ordered by the court.
Id. at 1316. Rabbi Immanuel Schochet of Ontario, Canada and Rabbi Eliyahhu Touger of
Jerusalem, Israel were allowed to explain the Chabad movement and the obligatory practices
and rituals that are binding on Hasids, followers of Hasidism. Id. at 1320. Rabbi Touger
explained how Jews commonly meet in their rabbis' homes:
It is longstanding Jewish practice to gather in the homes of Rabbis--either because
they cannot come to the synagogue or as a token of respect-for communal prayer.
And yet no one would consider their private homes anything other than that. For
example in my community in Jerusalem, there is a [minyan] three times a day in the
home of Rav Ovadah Yosef, the former [C]hief Rabbi of Israel. Now although he
lives in an apartment building with 20+ families, no one considers his holding these
prayer services as transforming his home into a synagogue.
Id. at 1319; see also Eliyahu Ashtor, Minyan, in 12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 67 (1982) (de-
fining the term "minyan" as a prayer quorum of ten Jews). Rabbi Schochet also concurred
that "communal prayer will not transform the private dwelling into a synagogue" or conse-
crated place. Konikov 1, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
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the rabbi's claim that his home was not a house of worship will cause the
code's definition of "religious institution" to fall short.'75
Rabbi Konikov sued Orange County, Florida and four members of the
county's Code Enforcement Board claiming that the county's enforcement of
its zoning regulations violated his right to practice Judaism. 7 6 In total,
Konikov's complaint contained nine counts, which included a challenge to
the county code based on the Free Exercise Clause of the United States and
Florida Constitutions, as well as various claims under RLUIPA and Florida's
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (FRFRA) of 1998.' 7 There was also a
count of civil conspiracy.'
The Free Exercise claims under both the United States Constitution and
the Florida Constitution were held invalid based on the court's ruling that
"It]he Orange County zoning ordinances comprise a valid system of land use
regulation that does not infringe on Plaintiffs constitutional rights."'7 9 The
court found that Konikov was controlled by Grosz v. City of Miami Beach,80
which dealt with a similar situation in which the court ruled that the zoning
ordinance in question did not violate the plaintiffs free exercise of relig-
ion.181 While Grosz did not involve Chabad, it did involve another Orthodox
Jewish group that was held in violation of city zoning ordinances by holding
religious services in the residence of their rabbi. 8 In Grosz, the court con-
cluded that zoning laws aimed at maintaining the residential quality of a
neighborhood must be enforced "whenever that quality is threatened."'' 83 The
court concluded that the Groszs could find another location nearby with dif-
ferent zoning to hold services and not find their religious observances re-
stricted.'8" In addition to denying Rabbi Konikov's claims based on the
precedent set by Grosz, the court also predicated its denial on the same rea-
sons for which Konikov's RLUIPA claim was denied. 85
175. See Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov 111), 410 F.3d 1317, 1328 (11 th Cir. 2005).
The code defines a "religious institution" as a place "used primarily or exclusively for reli-
gious worship and related religious activities." Id. at 1328 (internal quotations omitted).
176. Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov 11), 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1331, 1336 (M.D.
Fla. 2004).
177. Id. at 1336.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1337.
180. 721 F.2d 729 (llth Cir. 1983).
181. Konikov 11, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1338-40 (citing Grosz, 721 F.2d at 733, 741).
182. Id. at 1338-39 (citing Grosz, 721 F.2d at 731-32).
183. Id. at 1340 (quoting Grosz, 721 F.2d at 739).
184. Id. at 1341 (citing Grosz, 721 F.2d at 739).
185. Id. at 1345.
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While RLUIPA was enacted to broaden religious protection, the court
held that Rabbi Konikov did not show that his religious exercise had been
sufficiently burdened.'8 6 The court also explained that while the county zon-
ing regulations might make religious practice more expensive based on ap-
propriation of suitable facilities for worship, this did not mean that a "sub-
stantial burden" under RLUIPA was manifested. 187 The RFRA claim was
decided similarly in that Konikov did not present evidence as to a substantial
burden in light of the county's compelling interest to maintain the residential
quality of the neighborhood. 188
Rabbi Konikov also charged civil conspiracy against four members of
the Board, arguing that they conspired to violate his religious rights. 9 This
count is understandably a common complaint among Jewish groups that find
themselves in the minority and find their freedom to practice their beliefs
restricted. Whether the limitation is based on antisemitism or not, it is hard
to prove such a claim, and, thus, often left out of complaints. 9° Konikov was
unable to present enough evidence to prove the conspiracy claim.' 9' In all
nine counts, the Middle District of Florida ruled against Rabbi Konikov and
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.'92 The case was then
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.'93
It was the RLUIPA claims of unequal treatment and Due Process viola-
tions that the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded to the Middle Dis-
trict.'94 The court found that the relevant "question [was] whether the land
use regulation or its enforcement treats religious assemblies and institutions
on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies and institutions."'95
The code did not define "religious organization" even though Konikov was
186. Konikov II, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1344. While RLUIPA's whole aim is to prevent un-
reasonable government exclusion of religious groups from a jurisdiction, the court concluded
that the statute's use of the word "unreasonabl[e]" suggests Congress must have intended that
"religious assemblies could be reasonably limited within a jurisdiction." Id. at 1345-46.
187. Id. at 1345.
188. Id. at 1346.
189. Id. at 1357.
190. See Konikov II, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1357. "'An action for civil conspiracy ordinarily
requires proof of an agreement between two or more people to achieve an illegal objective, an
overt act in furtherance of that illegal objective, and a resulting injury to the plaintiff."' Id.
(quoting Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banks of Fla., Inc., 140 F.3d 898, 912
( lIth Cir. 1998)).
191. Id. at 1357.
192. Id. at 1358.
193. Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov II1), 410 F.3d 1317 (1lth Cir. 2005).
194. Id. at 1319 n.l.
195. Id. at 1324.
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cited for operating one. 196 The Board based much of their conclusion-that
Konikov operated a religious organization-on the investigation of the Code
Enforcement Division. 97 The court's analysis of the transcript of the Board
hearing showed that the Board's conclusions relied heavily on the weight of
the evidence showing a high frequency of meetings. 9 However, the testi-
mony by the Code Enforcement Officers showed that even they were unclear
as to what constituted high frequency.' 99 The court recognized the contrast
between the violation by Konikov's Chabad, which was cited for a few
weekly meetings, and those meetings which are not considered violations-
such as when the Cub Scouts hold weekly meetings out of homes or even
when friends gathered to watch a sports game a few times a week.2"u There
are no examples of the officers citing those groups.2"' "In other words, a
group meeting with the same frequency as Konikov's would not violate the
Code, so long as religion is not discussed. This is the heart of [the court's]
",202 cutcndiscomfort with the enforcement of this provision. Thus, the court con
cluded that by treating religious assemblies on unequal terms with nonreli-
gious assemblies, an equal terms violation existed.20 3 Because the Code was
not clear on what constitutes a violation, the court also held that there was no
fair notice to those that might be violating the Code.2°
On remand to the Middle District in January 2006, in light of the Elev-
enth Circuit's opinion, District Judge John Antoon II concluded both in favor
of Rabbi Konikov on his RLULPA challenge and his claim that the Code was
unconstitutionally vague. 20 5  The court found that the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion clearly pointed to the Board's violation of RLUIPA and that Orange
County failed to provide any compelling reason for treating Chabad differ-
ently then other religious groups.20 6 The court also held that the Code was
196. Id. at 1330. The court discussed how the Code defined "religious institution," but not
"religious organization," which when given their ordinary and natural meaning, are distinct
from one another. Id. at 1328, 1330.
197. SeeKonikovIII,410F.3dat 1330-31.
198. Id. at 1327.
199. Id. at 1328. Testimony by two of the Code Enforcement Division officers makes
clear that the code is unclear as to what constitutes a violation. Id. While the manager of the
division commented "that even one meeting per week might constitute a violation," another
officer "testified that it would not be a violation for a group to meet with the same frequency
as Konikov if the group had a social or family-related purpose." Id.
200. Konikov II1, 410 F.3d at 1328.
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1329.
204. Id. at 1329-31.
205. Konikov Order, supra note 166, at 1, 9-10.
206. Id. at 3, 6.
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vague as to its definition of "religious organization '20 7 and, therefore, also
vague as to its notice to citizens of what in fact the regulation prohibits. °8
While for now Konikov has won his case, the final celebration will have to
wait until the county decides what move it will make next.2°9
B. Hollywood Is Home to Chabad
Not too far south of Orange County, a similar Chabad lawsuit was initi-
ated in Broward County.21° While in the Orange County case Rabbi Konikov
was up against tough odds because he could have sought an exception to the
zoning code and did not, in this case in Hollywood, Rabbi Korf did apply for
the exception.21'
In Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc., v. City of Hollywood, Cha-
bad is in the midst of litigation to protect its Chabad center from seemingly
biased actions on the part of the City and one particular city commissioner. 2
The Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. (HCS) is a Chabad center lo-
cated in a residential neighborhood of Hollywood. 13
In 1999, Yosef Elul, president of the synagogue, purchased two homes
for the purpose of holding classes on Judaism and to serve as a residence for
the associate rabbi of the synagogue.2"4 At that time, religious services were
also being held there, and it was suggested to the synagogue by the Director
of Planning for the City of Hollywood that they apply for a House of Wor-
ship Special Exception.1 5 In May of 2001, an exception was applied for and
"[t]he Board of Appeal and Adjustments (BAA) granted a six month Special
Exception., 21 6 In September 2001, HCS was granted a one-year exception
and was informed that it was to be reviewed by the Board after the year was
up.2
17
207. Id. at 7.
208. Id. at 8-9.
209. Rich McKay, Rabbi Wins Long Fight for Religious Rights, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan.
24, 2006, at B 1.
210. Telephone Interview with Jason Gordon, Attorney for Chabad, Broad and Cassel in
Fort Lauderdale, Florida (July 19, 2005).
211. Id.
212. See HCS Order, supra note 151, at 1, 3.
213. See id. at 2.
214. HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 8.
215. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 2.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2-3.
2006]
23
Reinstein: The Growth of Chabad in the United States and the Rise of Chabad
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LAW REVIEW
During this time, Chabad members were regularly receiving parking
tickets for parking on the synagogue's property.218 The rabbi witnessed that
only the cars parked on the side of the synagogue's property were ticketed
and not other similarly parked cars across the street or nearby.219 Upon fur-
ther inquiry, the rabbi was told by an officer that he was following the orders
of Commissioner Sal Oliveri. 220 The synagogue administrator also relayed
that a Code Enforcement Officer told him "that the department was under
orders from Commissioner Sal Oliveri and the Mayor to keep an eye on the
Chabad ... and to enforce the code. 2 1
"In September 2002, the Development Review Board... granted... a
six month Temporary Special Exception subject to certain enumerated condi-
tions., 222 The Board explained that the property could be used as a house of
worship and be "compatible with the existing natural environment and other
properties within the vicinity. 223 Commissioner Oliveri filed an appeal to
the Commission.224
Seemingly without a response to Oliveri's September 2002 appeal, in
March 2003 the Board granted the synagogue a Permanent Special Exception
subject to certain conditions being met within six months.225 Commissioner
Oliveri appealed again.226
One month after receiving the Permanent Special Exception, the Com-
mission reversed the decision of the Development Review Board finding that
HCS was "too controversial. 227 Oliveri was recorded as saying, "'it's al-
most common sense and reasonable that the Chabad ... will never fit in Hol-
lywood Hills.' 228
218. See id. at 3.
219. Id.
220. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 3.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 3-4. Five conditions were laid out by the Board: 1) no parking was permitted
in the alley behind the synagogue; 2) a lease agreement for off-site parking must be obtained;
3) City-approved garbage dumpsters were required; 4) they must enter into a property mainte-
nance agreement with a provider who will keep the property in compliance with the city code;
and 5) they must create an approved buffer along the rear side of the residences. Id. at 4 n. 1.
223. Id. at 4.
224. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 4. HCS also claims that "Oliveri was permitted to
vote on his own appeal and cast the deciding vote... [which was] against" Commission pro-
cedure. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
228. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 5.
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By July of 2004, Commissioner Oliveri was asking the Commission
"'to evict' HCS.229 He even went so far as to say in support of eviction,
"'[w]e're talking about neighborhoods here. We're talking about neighbor-
hoods having a smell.' ' 230 Later that month, the city filed suit in Broward
County Circuit Court against HCS for operating as a house of worship with-
out a Special Exception.23 1
HCS offered as evidence of unfair treatment that there were at least
twelve houses of worship in residential neighborhoods in Hollywood Hills.
232
In one home only blocks away from HCS is a residence operating as a shrine
to the Virgin Mary. 233 Even though numerous complaints have been made
about the traffic, noise and garbage associated with the activities there, no
Special Exception has been requested or granted.23 When Oliveri was asked
by synagogue members as to why the shrine was not required to obtain an
exception, he is alleged to have shrugged them off claiming the shrine did
not need an exception because it was a miracle.235
HCS filed a complaint in federal court in response to the state court
complaint by the city.236 The amended complaint by HCS had a total of fif-
teen counts, levied against the city and Oliveri, individually.237 Most of the
claims centered around HCS's First Amendment rights (freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, and freedom of assembly) being taken away by the de-
nial of the Special Exception, as well as various similar claims under
RLUIPA and FRFRA. 238 The First Amendment claims are similar to those
made by Rabbi Konikov in Konikov v. Orange County.239
229. Id.
230. Id. at 5, 22. In a footnote to the court's order, Judge Lenard adds that "Oliveri subse-
quently stated that his comment was an effort to compare his efforts to protect his single fam-
ily neighborhood with the City of Hollywood's efforts to protect the Hollywood Lakes section
from a smelly waste treatment facility." Id. at 5 n.5.
231. Id. at 5.
232. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 5.
233. Id. at 6. Rosa Lopez, who owns the home, has hosted as many as 4000 people. Id.
She also operates a gift shop on the premises. Id.
234. See id.
235. See HCS Order, supra note 151, at 6. Oliveri is alleged to have replied: "[T]he Vir-
gin Mary visits that particular home .... If you people know anything about the Catholic
religion, that's called a vision. To Christians and Catholics, that is considered a miracle.
That's not establishing a house of worship. That is a miracle." Id. (omission in original).
236. See HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 1, 16.
237. Id. at 17-33. At the time of the writing of this paper there was only one order issued
by the court. See HCS Order, supra note 151.
238. See HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 22-26.
239. See Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov 11), 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2004),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 410 F.3d 1317 (11 th Cir. 2005).
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One of the counts that HCS charged was that the its right to Substantive
Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated.24° This charge
was based on the Commission's reversal of the Board's decision to grant the
Permanent Special Exception.24 HCS claimed the Commissions' reversal
had nothing to do with "public health, safety, welfare or morals., 242 This
claim was substantiated by the fact that HCS had not created a greater prob-
lem than the other twelve houses of worship in the neighborhood and the
shrine a few blocks away.243 Also, distinct from Konikov, HCS applied for
the exception and at least temporarily received it.24  HCS could therefore
claim a property interest in the grant of the exception and an injury based on
its expenditures for relying on that grant in good faith.245 HCS claimed this
property right is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. 246
Some of the actions described by HCS as violating its rights are charged
against Oliveri specifically.247 In count three of the complaint, HCS claims
that he abused his power and authority as a commissioner.2" By ordering
law enforcement to focus their attention on HCS and to only ticket syna-
gogue members' cars, HCS argued that "Oliveri acted under color of law" to
249harass HCS's congregants. The synagogue did not claim, for example,
that cars parked on the side of the road cannot be ticketed according to the
city's parking code, but rather that under the direction of Oliveri there had
been selective enforcement of this code.250 Thus, HCS claimed that Oliveri
has denied its members rights guaranteed by the Constitution.25'
Making the accusations against Oliveri is one thing, but it is much more
difficult to bring Oliveri into court. While no decisions have been reached
by the court on the merits of HCS's claims, HCS did overcome a high hurdle
in just being able to sue Oliveri individually. Since Oliveri is a city commis-
sioner, generally, his status as a government official would entitle him to
240. HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 29.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 8-9.
245. HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 29.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 20-21, 27.
248. Id. at 20. Oliveri succeeded in having this claim dismissed based on HCS's lack of
proof "that it was arbitrarily and capriciously deprived of its property right in a Permanent
Special Exception." HCS Order, supra note 151, at 33. The court held that there is no fun-
damental right in the Constitution to a Permanent Special Exception. Id.
249. HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 21.
250. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 20.
251. HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 21.
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qualified immunity.252 This defense was argued by Oliveri in his motion to
dismiss the case.253
Qualified immunity is meant to free the hands of government officials,
individually, who are acting in the legal capacity of their office and to pre-
vent them from constantly defending frivolous lawsuits.254 The caveat to this
type of immunity is that if an official knowingly violates long held "statutory
or constitutional right[s] of which a reasonable person would have known,"
then such immunity cannot serve as a defense.255 The court stated that it does
not shield "'the plainly incompetent and those who knowingly violated the
law."'9
256
In determining whether Oliveri was shielded by qualified immunity
from the charges levied by HCS, the court had to first determine if the com-
missioner "was acting within the scope of his . . . authority when the alleg-
edly unconstitutional acts [claimed by HCS] took place. 257  The court
looked at the accusation that he abused his power by instructing law en-
forcement personnel to ticket HCS cars parked on the side of road.258 In this
example, the court found that it was his job to ensure that the city's code was
being upheld. 9 Since it was within his power to instruct law enforcement to
make sure that residents abided by parking regulations, Oliveri did act within
his job.26 Once Oliveri proved this, the burden shifted to HCS to show that
qualified immunity does not apply.2 6'
At first, the court noted that when looking at Oliveri's activities gener-
ally, they appeared to fall within the discretion of his job as commissioner
(e.g., working with code inspectors and police on upholding parking regula-
tions in the community).262 But after its analysis, the court changed its view
based on HCS's claims of selective enforcement of the law in order to harass
synagogue members and disrupt and discourage HCS's activities.263 The
court stated that the testimony regarding the selective enforcement of parking
and the comments regarding the shrine indicated "a nexus linking Oliveri,
the harassment of the synagogue by city personnel, and the discouragement
252. See Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1081 (11 th Cir. 2004).
253. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 16.
254. Williams v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, 341 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11 th Cir. 2003).
255. Ray, 370 F.3d at 1081.
256. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 16 (quoting Ray, 370 F.3d at 1082).
257. Id. (citing Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1314 (1 th Cir. 2003)).
258. Id. at 20.
259. Id. at 19.
260. Id.
261. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 19-20.
262. Id. at 19.
263. Id. at 20-22.
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of the Chabad from continuing its religious activities in the Hollywood Hills
neighborhood."' Those facts were also "sufficient to state a prima facie
case of selective enforcement. '265 The court ruled that if the amended com-
plaint was "taken as true and if all reasonable inferences therefrom are con-
sidered in the light most favorable" to HCS, then "a reasonable person could
find that Defendant Oliveri targeted the Synagogue and its members for the
purpose of discouraging them from joining together to practice their faith. ' 26
The court found that all of the facts taken together as presented by HCS and
the allegation that the inspections and citations happened over a long period
of time were enough to establish that Oliveri's behavior and orders fell out-
side the permitted range of conduct for a commissioner. 267
The facts presented by HCS have so far been enough to overcome Oliv-
eri's motion to dismiss, but the judge has warned HCS that more evidence
will be needed to substantiate the facts presented to overcome Oliveri's
qualified immunity defense on a likely forthcoming motion for summary
judgment. 68 While the conclusions by the court are merely reflective of
HCS's right to go forward with their claims of constitutional violations, it is
a significant step in moving forward against Oliveri. Unless some compro-
mise is met, there is likely still a long way to go before the Chabad members
of the Hollywood Community Synagogue are out of the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Chabad's goal or mission when it comes to outreach is to be seen and to
be heard.269 Chabad emissaries are driven by the Rebbe's message of spread-
ing Judaism to those who want to embrace it.27° Sometimes, though, the
264. Id. at 23.
265. Id. at 25. Oliveri argued that he could not have targeted Chabad for selective en-
forcement, since Temple Sinai and Temple Solel, which operated near HCS, were similarly
situated (meaning both were Jewish houses of worship) and there were no allegations against
Oliveri from those synagogues. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 28. The court seemed to think
Oliveri's argument was misguided and responded accordingly:
This line of argument appears to assume that the improper or discriminatory motive
underlying Oliveri's alleged acts is anti-Semitism, and then argues that anti-
Semitism has not been shown since there is no allegation of selective enforcement
against Temple Sinai of Hollywood and Temple Solel. The Court notes however
that Chabad, unlike Temple Sinai of Hollywood or Temple Solel, was described in
Commission hearings as "too controversial."
Id. at 28-29.
266. Id. at 21.
267. Id. at 31.
268. Id. at 31-32.
269. FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 11-12.
270. Id.
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message is perceived as too loud by those who are not interested. Many have
resorted to the court system to silence Chabad. As the litigation headlining
Chabad around the country has shown, it is not very difficult today to bring a
lawsuit, nor to defend one. In Chabad's case, there are plenty of attorneys
who are willing to take on the case pro bono. Chabad members have also not
hesitated to initiate litigation when they felt their rights were being con-
strained. While the litigation might be time consuming, it has also helped
garner attention to Chabad and the attention often helps Chabad fundraise.
While clearly Chabad rabbis and members are not seeking to be sued,
nor do they want to be forced into court to be able to display a religious
symbol or to hold services out of their home, such things have become regu-
lar occurrences in the past two decades. This situation may be partly due to
the ever-growing ease of bringing a lawsuit, or it may be due to the growth
of Chabad. Whichever way, it does not appear that there is an end in sight
for either.
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